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The aim of this study is to give an overview of the significance of 
economic incentives in fishery management under the theory of agency.  
Fisheries management is primarily associated with monitoring, 
enforcement and control measures.The reason is that objective of society 
and fishermen do not converge and management authorithies react by 
introducing stricter and costlier control measures. This has raised, in the 
literature and in the fishery economic research, the need for a deeper 
knowledge of the rationale inducing fishermen to comply.In other words, 
the questions to be anwered concern what kind of incentives could be set 
in order to make fishermen to modify their behaviour meeting the 
management and society’s objective. In the economic literature problems 
like that are often addressed in the theory of information economics and 
principal-agent methods. 
The economic theory of agency characterises the contractual 
relationships between individuals in the economy in terms of a principal 
and one or more agents. The principal (in this case the fishery 
management authority) seeks to ensure that the aggregate of the choices 
of all the individual decision-making agents (fishing firms) is in the 
interest of the society. However, the (private) interests of the individual 
agents may not be the same as of the (public) interest of the principal. If 
perfect enforcement of desired behaviour on the part of all agents is not 
feasible, the principal must try to establish an incentive scheme that will 
align the interests of the agents with those of the principal. 
Economic incentives can be used by the managing authority (the 
principal) to induce particular responses or behaviours from investors or 
actors (the agents) in the fishing industry, either by reducing profits (in 
the case of negative incentives) or by increasing profits (in the case of 
positive incentives). The determination of the correct  value of the 
incentive which lets the principal (managers) to induce the agent 
(fisherman) to comply with the rules (e.g. fishing one target species rather 
than an other) requires managers to solve an optimisation problem with a 
number of economic constraints.  
Only few analyses applying the principal-agent approach to economic 
incentives in fisheries management exist and among those are non-point 
pollution problems, of Segerson ([6] 1988) that have some resemblance 
to the infliction of fishing mortality to the fish stock from unknown 
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fishermen. The modelling of international fisheries relations (Clarke and 
Munro [1] 1987) should also be mentioned here.  
Frost et al. ([2] 2001) has gone further on this subject by analysing the 
role and the meaning of different types of positive and negative 
incentives under various fishery management options (quota 
management, effort reduction and EU-decommissioning scheme). 
 
 
2. Information assumptions  
 
The solution to the economic incentive problem is very sensitive to 
the information assumptions. The economic theory make distinction 
among the cases of a) full information, b) asymmetric information and c) 
lack of information. 
Economic analyses are often based on assumptions of perfect or full 
information on the market and models do not present any problem. In this 
case the principal always knows what is the real type of agent he has to 
relate to and what he is doing; therefore he is able to react precisely on 
that information and to define precisely the economic incentive in order 
to induce the agent to behave as he wishes.  
In the case of the fishery the assumption of full information is clearly 
not relevant because the managers often lack information about 
fishermen’s catches, fishermen’s cost functions, fishermen’s effort and of 
use of capacity after decommissioning or laying-up premiums.  
The literature distinguishes between two types of information 
problems that are associated with the actions of the agents and with the 
identification of “true” types, viewed from the principal’s perspective: the 
case of moral hazard and of adverse selection. 
A mathematical description of moral hazard is to be found in Laffont 
and Tirole ([4] 1993) who characterise moral hazard as a situation where 
the endogenous variable is unobservable. Hanley et al. ([3] 1997) stated 
that  “moral hazard arises when the actions of one person are 
unobservable to a second person”. For this reason Varian ([7] 1992, [8] 
1996) defines moral hazard models those models with hidden actions. 
Adverse selection as described also by Laffont and Tirole ([4] 1993) is 
a situation where exists asymmetric information about exogenous 
variables. while Hanley et al ([3] 1997) writes that “adverse selection 
exists when one person cannot identify the type or character of the 
 7
second person”. For this reason Varian ([7] 1992, [8] 1996) calls adverse 
selection models as models with hidden information. 
 
2.1 Moral Hazard models (hidden actions) 
If the principal does not know what the agent will do after the contract 
(the incentive) has been signed, a moral hazard problem could arises. In 
such cases it is important to know how the risk-bearing scheme is 
designed. A classical example for a moral hazard situation is that of the 
land's owner and the tenant. The problem with a fixed salary to the tenant 
is that the tenant does not have an incentive to maximise the value of the 
crop in the interest of the owner. The tenant may have other interests, 
which imply that the action of the tenant is associated with some 
uncertainty. He can choose between different options associated with 
different types of risk. He could be risk adverse and value the risky 
alternatives (i.e. securing the harvest in bad weather, or selling part of it 
on the black market) lower than the possible wages he will get from that 
alternative. In such a case the agent will not bear any risk and choose the 
safer alternative. The principal has to bear the risk. An incentive scheme 
with risk sharing could solve the problem.  
The case seems relevant in fisheries. A moral hazard behaviour can 
occur because after the fishermen have been allocated access (rights) to 
the fish resources, either in terms of catches or fishing days and/or a 
contract to withdraw has been agreed, there can be an incentive for the 
fishermen to change behaviour. The success of management is very 
dependent on the possibility to observe the action of the fishermen. It is 
therefore important to characterise the chosen management option (e.g. 
quota, effort management, fleet capacity adjustment) from the perspective 
of moral hazard, and in particular to what degree moral hazard applies to 
each case. As an example, in quota management option the landings can 
normally be observed while it is the catches that matter with respect to 
changes in the fish stock size. On the other hand, in effort management 
option, moral hazard takes place if the fisherman fish more days than 
allocated to him or fish at other fishing grounds than permitted. Moral 
hazard is not viewed as important in effort regulation as in quota 
regulation. In case a fisherman does not withdraw from fishing after a 
decommissioning or laying-up grant has been accepted, a moral hazard 
problem arises. However, it is often easier to observe whether or not a 
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vessel is used, and moral hazard is not viewed as being relevant in this 
case. 
 
2.2 Adverse Selection models (hidden information) 
In such cases the principal does not know much about e.g. the revenue 
(utility) or the cost functions of the agents, or the production technology 
(production function) he uses. All that is known is that the functions 
differ between agents and that the agent knows his own functions. It is 
further assumed that the agent wants to maximise his own profit or 
alternative objective function.  In such cases it is important for the 
principal to find out what type the agent really is. These cases are defined 
as adverse selection cases, since the problem here is that the agent tend to 
hide information. This issue seems particularly relevant when capacity 
adjustment measures (decommissioning and laying-up) and effort 
regulations are introduced by the authority and the aim is to efficiently 
distribute capacity reduction or effort.  
For example, the adverse selection problem occurs in all cases 
associated with the principal’s aim to allocate the fishing rights to the 
fishermen in a way that secures economic efficiency. If individual quotas 
or fishing days or decommissioning grants are allocated, the fisherman 
may benefit from not revealing his true type to the principal. The 
fisherman does not necessarily change behaviour after he has been 
allocated his fishing right, but he could still be in a better position in 
terms of profit making by announcing a wrong type to the principal. The 
adverse selection problem addresses how the principal can make the 
fisherman to reveal his true type. The two cases analysed refer to this 
specific aspect of the P-A- theory.  
Finally, a few words about the case of lack of information must be 
said. This case refers to the situation where both the principal and the 
agent lack information about relevant parameters. Anyway, in developed 
fisheries, it is hard to imagine that neither the fisherman (agent) nor the 
society (principal) have no information at all about catches, costs or 





3. An application of the principal-agent approach to the effort 




The aim of this case study is to analyse the Italian system of economic 
incentives, related to the reduction or control of fishing effort (in terms of 
fishing days), in the framework of the microeconomic model of the 
Principal and the Agent, and therefore validate or not the theoretical 
information problem.  
 
For a theoretical analysis of the premium scheme within the P-A model, 
the definition of the subjects involved and of their targets is crucial. The 
Principal is the subject which, in order to achieve its objective, has to 
induce another subject to adopt a given behaviour, while the Agent is the 
subject which – based upon the contract proposed by the principal – is 
intended to adopt a given behaviour.  
 
Reduction in fishing effort (meant as capacity, in terms of registered 
tonnage and engine power multiplied by fishing days) can be achieved 
either through a final  or a temporary withdrawal of the fishing activity. 
In this paper the effectiveness of the temporary withdrawal and the 




3.1. Choice of the case study 
 
In Italy, the reduction of the fishing effort is implemented also through 
temporary withdrawal according to vessel gears and fishing areas. With 
respect to bottom trawlers and mid-water pair trawlers, annuals national 
regulation provides for a standard 45 days suspension of the fishing 
activity.1  
 
                                                          
1 The regulation on temporary withdrawal or  has been substantially changed over the 
years both with respect to the applying periods and their nature (compulsory or 
facultative). 
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This regulation is differently enforced in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian 
coasts. The main difference relates to the nature of the suspension which 
is compulsory for vessels operating along the Adriatic Sea coasts and 
facultative for vessels operating along the Tyrrhenian Sea coasts. The 
reference period varies as well. Usually temporary withdrawal covers the 
months of July-August in the Adriatic area and September–October in the 
Tyrrhenian and Ionic area. Fishing withdrawal periods are based upon 
stocks reproduction periods that are very large and diversified.  
 
The application of the P–A model is limited as to the gear used by vessel 
owners. The causes could be briefly suggested, namely: (a) the only 
temporary withdrawal measure is the one associated to bottom trawlers, 
mid-water pair trawlers and dredges; (b) the latter two fishing gears are 
mainly performed in the Adriatic sea; and, finally, (c) it is meaningless to 
include into the P–A model a compulsory withdrawal, as applied for the 
Adriatic sea). Then, the selected Italian case study is the case of the 
vessels holding bottom trawler licences only and operating in the 
Tyrrhenian Sea.  
 
 
3.2.  Methodological approach 
 
The methodological approach used in this case-study can be briefly 
summarised and the following definitions will be used:: 
 
Principal: Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry Policy, as the national 
fishing Authority. 
 
Agents: vessels holding bottom trawler licenses, as operators accepting or 
not the contract (the premium). 
 
Aim of the principal: reducing fishing effort on demersal stock resources. 
 
Economic incentive signal sent by the Principal: premium. 
 
The (optional) temporary withdrawal is not part of a command and 
control-based policy (such as TAC, compulsory , and minimum mesh 
and/or fish size). It is instead a management measure as part of the 
fishing policy where the degree of “co-operation” of fishermen plays a 
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crucial role. In order to achieve its target, the principal could send a 
signal (premium or allowance) whose aim is to induce the agent to adopt 
behaviour consistent with the achievement of the Principal pre-set targets. 
The agent will then evaluate whether to accept or not this signal. The 
target will be achieved if the Principal has defined the signal properly, 
and a proper signal is the signal which, meeting the agent’s expectations, 
will induce him to accept the proposed contract. The contract is the 
option to accept or not the premium or allowance to temporarily 
withdraw from  the fishing activity.   
 
The analysis of the case study starts by setting the principal’s target 
function – the fishing effort reduction to minimise catches - relating to 
each single agent. This target is pursued, by hypothesis, by the principal 
by granting a premium to the agents accepting the contract.  
 
In order to have homogeneous quantities in the target function, the target 
can be denoted in terms of minimisation of the income resulting from the 
catch of demersal species 2, hereinafter referred to as Fog (acronyms 
denoting species belonging to the headings “other fishes” which demersal 
species belong). 
 
The target function of the principal will then be: 
 
( ) (1)                                                                 FogY :Min  
 
with the constraint 
 




Y(Fog) = income derived from catch of demersal species; 
                                                          
2 The function can be expressed in terms of returns and not in terms of catches. Supply is 
highly fragmented and then the single agent cannot affect pricing; consequently to them it 
will not make any difference making evaluations in terms of minimisation of income or 
catches. 
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P= premium or allowance granted to the vessel (agent) accepting the 
contract, that is the temporary withdrawal of the fishing activity.  
 
The constraint is included in the principal’s target function allowing for a 
rational process; i.e. the agent could not accept the contract if the 
premium will not be at least equal to the potential income that it could 
gain during the suspension period.  
 
The identification of the value of P, will be the result of the minimisation 
of (2).  
 
Let’s calculate, for (2), the prime derivative of Y and P against D (fishing 
days) and let’s assume it is equal to zero3: 
 
(3)                                                        0dP  
D
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This means that the minimum point of the target function, against D, will 
correspond to the level of D (fishing days) where the premium and 
income variations are equal. Theoretically, in order to calculate the 
premium the principal should allow for premium-income elasticity.  
 
If we impose a linear relationship between income and fishing days, the 
income average variation will be equivalent to their marginal variation. 
The analysis will then be based upon the average income per unit of 
working days on board (fishing days). For the agent to be induced to 
accept the contract it is necessary to give him an allowance balancing the 
withdrawal revenues losses; i.e., the loss of income corresponding to 45 
fishing work days and the loss of interests accruing as result of any 
delays in granting the premium.  
                                                          
3Also the premium P, being related to income, will be a function of D. 
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Income loss will be equal to  
 






−−+= )(  
 
i.e. the agent’s opportunity cost, 
where: 
n = days of suspension of the fishing activity; 
Yi = potential income of the i-th day; 
s = discount rate calculated on a daily basis. 
 
To considers the loss of interests a capitalisation operation on C for the 
period (n-1)+t has to be made:  
 
( )( ) (6)                                                                  r1CC pt1np +−+=  
 
where: 
C= current value of the income flows for the withdrawal period as 
calculated in (5); 
r = interest rate on public investments (return on treasury bonds), 
calculated on a daily basis; 
(n-1)+ tp = capitalisation period given by the sum of the time elapsing 
from the beginning of the withdrawal period (n-1) and tp , the “delay” - 
vis-à-vis the conclusion of the withdrawal period – in granting bonuses 
(a delay taken into account by the principal). 
The agent will accept the contract only if the premium granted by the 
principal will balance the income losses resulting from its temporary 
withdrawal from the activity, also allowing for the delay factor. The 
premium – the economic incentive market signal - expected by the agent 
will be the result of a logical process similar to the one made by the 
principal. However, while the principal calculates the premium based 
upon elasticity average values, the agent will calculate it based upon its 
own elasticity.  
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The agent will expect a premium equal to:  
 
( )( ) (7)                                                                  r1CC at1na +−+=  
 
where the difference, compared to (6), lies in the elasticity value of each 
single agent and in the different value of the delay factor. In fact, while tp 
denotes the delay expected by the principal (and allowed for in its pay-off 
planning and of the structure of the suggested bonus grant systems), ta 
denotes the previous delay experienced by the agent.  
 
If the agent’s evaluations are based on economic factors, the condition of 
acceptance of the contract will be:  
 
(8)                                                                                    CC pa ≤  
 
In the case study Cp will be considered equal to the bonus hypothetically 
established every year by ministerial decree (the proposed regulation) and 
granted to the units accepting the temporary withdrawal. This decree will 
also provide for the application period of the measure hereinabove.  
 
The acceptance condition in (8) will then become: 
 




P = bonus calculated when complying ance with the hypothetical 
regulation in force on temporary withdrawal from the fishing activity.  
 
The assumptions underlying this methodology of analysis are: 
1. the agent perfectly knows the value of its opportunity cost C; 
2. the acceptance condition is based on economic evaluations only; 
3. information on elasticity and then on opportunity cost may not be 
properly transferred to the principal, facing hidden information; this 
might be due to a voluntary behaviour of the agent or to faults in the 
information transfer channels. In case of not observed data the error 




Once the values of Ca and P have been calculated with respect to each 
single agent, in relation to these two elements, four situations can be 
outlined which will hold true provided that the assumptions listed 
hereinafter are correct:  
 
1. if Ca ≤ P and the agent accepts, rational behaviour from the economic 
standpoint; 
2. if Ca ≤ P and the agent does not accept, there is a non economic 
rationale;   
3. if Ca > P the agent accepts, as 2. 
4. If Ca > P and the agent does not accept, as 1. 
 
 
3.3. Application of the model to the case study 
 
The study case started by defining the reference year. As the theoretical 
model of the P-A is consistent only with an optional management 
measure, the analysis was focused on a sample of vessels holding bottom 
trawler license only and carrying out their activity in the Tyrrhenian and 
Jonic waters in the year 1998.4  
 
After defining the case study, the model was applied as follows:  
 
1. identification of the vessels included in the sample (see Annex IB, 
table I.1) and participating in the temporary withdrawal in 1998; 
2. identification of the reference year for the calculation of the agents’ 
opportunity cost; 
3. with respect to the year in point 2 above, identification of a sample of 
vessels with technical characteristics similar to those of the vessels 
included in the sample referring to the year 19985; 
4. calculation of the opportunity cost of each of above agents;  
5. calculation of the hypothetical bonuses to be granted to the vessels 
which accepted the temporary withdrawal of the activity;  
                                                          
4 This sample is a sub-group of a wider statistical sample used by IREPA to monitor the 
production structures of fishing vessels in Italy. 
5 Data collection on returns and costs for both the years 1998 and 1995 covered some 
sample’s units only. 
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6. with respect to each single agent, comparison between the 
opportunity cost and the bonus calculations as in point 4. 
 
 
3.4. Identification of vessels and steps of the analysis 
 
1. To identify vessels which hypothetically accepted the “agent’s 
contract” 1998, reference was made to the vessel formularies 
transmitted by each single vessel during the withdrawal period, i.e. 
from 14 September to 28 October 1998.  
 
2. To identify the reference year it was necessary to select the ones 
where the temporary withdrawal was facultative in the past 
experience. In fact it should be reminded that, in the past years, 
temporary withdrawals in the Tyrrhenian and Ionic coasts were 
sometimes compulsory or facultative. The more recent year until 
1998 , when fishermen were free to decide whether to participate or 
not in the temporary withdrawal was 1995. 
 
3. To identify vessels with tonnage (Grt), overall length (OL-meters) 
and engine power (kW) which were similar compared to those of 
1998 considered, priority was given to select similar size in terms of 
gross registered tonnage; in second order, the overall length and 
engine power6 was considered.  
 
4. Stage three enables calculation of the 1995 daily value added for each 
vessel under consideration between September - October, which 
usually are the months covered by the temporary withdrawal in the 
Tyrrhenian and Ionic Sea. Based upon the above average value, the 
opportunity cost of each single agent (vessel) was calculated in 
relation to days vessels were in port for the biological rest as for the 
decree of 1998. The opportunity cost, as expressed by (5) and (7), is 
considered equal to the present value of the income flow, which can 
be obtained by each unit during the withdrawal period. The 1995 
                                                          
6While in terms of tons and length the difference between the 1998 and 1995 units ranges 
between  –14% and +4%, in terms of engine power the difference is wider, ranging 
between – 46% a + 19%.  
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daily value added was adjusted to consider the increase in the cost of 
life, allowing for an increase of 6,77%7, from September 1995 to 
September 1998. The reference time-discounted rate is the official 
discount rate in force from April to October 19988, calculated on a 
daily basis. The resulting capitalisation, as expressed in (7) based 
upon the return of treasury bonds in force as of 31.12.19989, was 
calculated on a daily basis as well in Annex IB, table I.2.  
 
5. The temporary withdrawal on 1998 was regulated by ministerial 
Decree of 16.06.98 providing for “the modes of implementation of 
the technical withdrawal of the fishing activities involving bottom 
trawlers and/or mid-water pair trawlers”; and by the Decree of 
09.07.98, providing for the associated social measures, to be 
addressed to the units which accepted the temporary withdrawal 
during the biological rest. This latter Decree provides for three 
different types of allowances:  
 
(a) for the crew: minimum pay for each member of the crew, to partially 
compensate loss in wages or revenues;  
(b) for the ship-owner: social security contributions for the members of 
the crew;  
(c) capacity adjustment in compliance with the regulation in force on 
labour safety, equal to: 3 millions ITL, up to 10 GRT; 6 millions ITL, 
from 10,1 to 50 GRT; 11 millions ITL, over 50 GRT.  
 
Based upon the information on the average number of the crew 
members, the allowance (premium) was calculated as allowing for 
the composition of the crew; only one unit is considered to be the 
skipper  (see Annex 1A, table I.3).  
 
6. In case of acceptance of the proposed “contract”, the parameters and 
amounts of the associated social measures by the national regulation 
                                                          
7 Monthly index numbers of consumer prices for household of blue collars and white 
collars from Fiscal guide, Frizzera, B. (1999) based on Italian Statistical Yearbook 1999, 
ISTAT. 
8 Official discount rate from Fiscal guide, Frizzera, B. (1999) based on Italian Statistical 
Yearbook 1999, Istat. 
9 Average percentage returns of the monetary market, Italian Statistical Yearbook 1998, 
Istat. 
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was considered hereinafter coincident with the premium granted to 
fishermen. The comparison between the agent’s opportunity cost and 
the premium enables the evaluation of what might happen should the 
agent’s decision-making process be based on merely economic 
evaluations. According to the model, the contract will be accepted by 
the agent which will be granted a premium higher or equal to its 
opportunity cost. It was then possible to check whether the real 
answer given by the sample vessels to the market signal sent by the 
principal (acceptance or rejection of the contract) corresponds to the 




3.5. Model results  
 
The analysis of the correspondence between the real situation and the 
situation assumed by the model led to the following conclusions:  
 
1. Real situation and economic rational answer are coincident and 
theoretically correct in 11 of the 22 cases under consideration; i.e., 
50% of the cases. This means that the model of analysis can explain 
half of the cases. 3 of them reproduce situation no. 1 (Ca ≤ P and the 
agent accepts) 10 and 7 cases reproduce situation no. 4 (Ca > P and 
the agent does not accept). This means that agents have a economic 
rational behaviour only in 50% of the cases (see Annex 1A, table I4);  
 
2. Out of the five regions investigated, only in Tuscany the model holds 
true in 100% of the cases. The degree of correspondence between real 
and economic rational answer in the Lygurian region is equal to 67%, 
followed by Lazio (44%) and Calabria (33%) regions. In the 
Campania Region, the answers given by the agents were just the 
opposite compared to the expected ones resulting from the 
application of the model.  
 
                                                          
10 It was assumed that, in case of a premium slightly lower than the income that might be 
generated by the fishing activity – the incomes net flow, the agent decides temporally 
withdraw from the activity, thus preferring a certain income (although slightly lower)- 
rather than an uncertain income. 
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3. In the model exercise, 50% of the cases investigated reproduce 
situation no. 3; i.e. the agent accepts the contract despite its 
opportunity cost that, in some cases, is much higher than the 
allowance granted by the principal. Such behaviour suggests that the 
agent’s decision are not based upon economic evaluations only.  
 
 
3.6. Improving results and conclusions: complementary desk-case study 
and questionnaires 
 
In addition to the variables taken into account, it is then necessary to 
identify which are the other variables that generate a different behaviour 
compared to the one outlined in the model. To this purpose a 
questionnaire was filled by the previous units under investigation (see 
Annex 1B). Questionnaires contains questions aimed to investigate about 
the adhesion or not to the “contract” offered by the Principal on 1998 and 
also to investigate the rationale either economic or not, that influenced 
each agent to accept or not the contract. Results are hereinafter reported:  
 
• Among cases of acceptance of the “contract” - 14 on 22, the relevant 
motivation is the possibility to enjoy a rest from fishing activity; even 
when real answer and economic rational correspond to premium 
higher than opportunity costs (3 cases);  
 
• Among cases of no acceptance of “contract” - 8 on 22, merely 
economic rationales prevail, that are: (a) immediacy and continuity of 
income flow deriving from fishing activity; (b) in case of adhesion, a 
fall down of fish prices at the restarting of fishing activity11. 
Furthermore it has to be considered the disagreement of most 
Tuscany and Ligurian fishermen with the biological rest measure.  
 
                                                          
11 It has been noted that, if most of the agents adhere to the temporary withdrawal of 
fishing activity, commercial activities (e.g. restaurants, wholesaling, retailing, catering) 
supply themselves with fish products by not local suppliers, in particular by Adriatic ones, 
where biological rest takes place in a different period. The price of Adriatic fish products 
is generally lower than the Tyrrhenian ones. Than, after the temporary withdrawal, an 
adjustment of Tyrrhenian fishing prices to the Adriatic ones may happen, e.g., a fall 
down. 
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Answers from questionnaires enabled to add another variable, resulting 
from this difference: 
 
                                                                                    U PCa =−  
 
U represents the utility perceived by fishermen from an economic good, 
either monetary or not, that will assume different features for each single 
agent. In fact, in the cases of acceptance of the contract, the positive 
value of U 12 represents utility of the rest from fishing activity, that is the 
value that the agent attributes to the possibility to withdraw from fishing 
for a period of time equal to the biological rest; for this he receives an 
allowance equal to the premium. This implies that even if the value of Ca 
is major than the value of P, the agent accepts because this difference 
represents for him the value of having a period of rest.  
 
In spite, in the cases of no acceptance the positive value of U represents 
the utility of the income, that is the value that the agent attributes to an 
income flow characterised by continuity and immediacy.13 These are the 
cases for which the methodology is verified (see Annex IB, table I.4).  
 
It’s straightforward to assert that the rationale of both Principal and 
Agent performs an information problem. It seems also that the nature of 
the asymmetric information problem depends on the nature or genesis of 
the analysis. The microeconomic approach of the Principal –agent theory 
cannot allow for good results for a macro context. In fact, in the 
determination process of the premium, the manager (principal) takes into 
account medium values of the variables that influence the agent’s 
decision, that is the representative agent.  
 
The result of this process shows that the setting of a premium, as a 
market signal according to medium values, will not be able to satisfy 
expectations for all the agents. Every single agent has, in fact, his own 
utility level related to the goods that make up his own consumption 
                                                          
12For data analysis,see Annex IA, table 1.4. 
13In fact it has to be outlined that it needs not less than 60 days to cash the allowance for 
the adhesion to the temporary withdrawal period. It’s clear that this delay influences the 
agent’s behaviour. 
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basket or welfare. 14 In the case study, rest and income from fishing 
activity have different values for different geographical areas and for 
different agents.  
 
It can be concluded that there is not a single level of the premium, 
determined by the manager at national level that can reach the result of a 
general adhesion to the “contract” – the temporary withdrawal for 
biological rest. Only if the determination process of the premium is 
supplemented with investigations about each single agent’s utility and his 
view and reaction to the current effort regulation, a good base is formed 
for the setting of an effective system of economic incentives based on 
market signals.  
                                                          
14It has to be outlined that both utility of rest and income have different values for single 
productive unit and for single member of the crew. See Annex IA, table 1. 
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Annex IA: Sampling and data analysis 
Table I.1 – Sample vessels under analysis - Tyrrhenian bottom trawlers, 
1998. 
Table I.2 - Added value, net present value and capitalised net present 
value.  
Table I.3 – Equivalent allowances granted for the adhesion to temporary 
withdrawal, 1998. 











registration number region administrative 
district
grt length kW average number of 
crew members'
07CR00080 CALABRIA Crotone 29,9 18,20 220 3                            
05CR00494 CALABRIA Crotone 14,1 16,67 161 3                            
06CR00250 CALABRIA Crotone 29,5 18,55 165 3                            
07SA00750 CAMPANIA Salerno 45,1 20,67 294 3                            
12SA00236 CAMPANIA Salerno 10,0 13,00 162 2                            
00SA02460 CAMPANIA Salerno 51,8 22,60 283 4                            
00CV02113 LAZIO Civitavecchia 46,8 22,00 411 3                            
00CV01997 LAZIO Civitavecchia 57,2 23,45 139 3                            
00CV02148 LAZIO Civitavecchia 39,5 18,70 205 3                            
04GA00955 LAZIO Gaeta 42,4 22,70 316 3                            
04GA01116 LAZIO Gaeta 46,7 19,87 283 3                            
04GA01016 LAZIO Gaeta 44,6 20,60 216 3                            
00GA01238 LAZIO Gaeta 47,0 23,38 330 2                            
01GA01325 LAZIO Gaeta 24,6 17,50 183 3                            
04GA00562 LAZIO Gaeta 46,7 16,10 198 3                            
05GE00085 LIGURIA Genova 23,9 15,00 158 2                            
02GE03307 LIGURIA Genova 17,4 16,50 176 2                            
00SP04301 LIGURIA La Spezia 16,3 12,70 161 2                            
02LI02668 TOSCANA Livorno 39,5 19,00 294 3                            
02LI02748 TOSCANA Livorno 28,0 16,35 272 3                            
08LI00074 TOSCANA Livorno 37,4 19,02 172 3                            
00VG03428 TOSCANA Viareggio 34,8 19,90 205 3                            
average values 35,1 18,75 227 3                           
Source: Economic observatory regarding production in marine fisherie in Italy, 1998.
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Table I.2 - Added value, net present value and capitalised net present 












C'' = net present value 
(b)
Ca (c )
07CR00080 894.345             954.936       31.421.720                     31.779.130                 
05CR00494 690.180             736.939       24.248.630                     24.524.459                 
06CR00250 446.048             476.268       15.671.370                     15.849.647                 
07SA00750 938.030             1.001.581    32.956.553                     33.331.419                 
12SA00236 432.043             461.314       15.179.305                     15.351.986                 
00SA02460 869.174             928.060       30.537.384                     30.884.736                 
00CV02113 655.302             699.698       23.023.231                     23.285.123                 
00CV01997 269.059             287.287       9.453.057                       9.560.612                   
00CV02148 521.138             556.445       18.309.562                     18.517.845                 
04GA00955 621.622             663.737       21.839.944                     22.088.378                 
04GA01116 474.367             506.505       16.666.302                     16.855.895                 
04GA01016 460.599             491.804       16.182.588                     16.366.680                 
00GA01238 883.587             943.449       31.043.749                     31.396.860                 
01GA01325 835.306             891.897       29.347.455                     29.681.274                 
04GA00562 746.466             797.039       26.226.174                     26.524.493                 
05GE00085 917.539             979.702       32.236.635                     32.603.313                 
02GE03307 971.036             1.036.824    34.116.190                     34.504.244                 
00SP04301 718.655             767.344       25.249.075                     25.536.282                 
02LI02668 480.636             513.199       16.886.570                     17.078.668                 
02LI02748 995.368             1.062.803    34.971.038                     35.368.814                 
08LI00074 972.582             1.038.474    34.170.483                     34.559.155                 
00VG03428 797.507             851.538       28.019.443                     28.338.158                 
average values 708.663            756.675       24.898.021                    25.181.235                 
Notes: (a) monthly index numbers of consumer prices for household of blue collars and white collars for the
period September 1995 - September 1998 (6,77%) from Fiscal guide, Frizzera, B. (1999) based on Italian
Statistical Yearbook 1999, Istat; (b) net present value based - for the 45 days of temporary withdrawal - on
the actualization rate in force from April to October 1998 (5%), calculated on a daily basis (0,013%)-
Official discount rate from Fiscal guide, Frizzera, B. (1999) based on Italian Statistical Yearbook 1999,
Istat; (c ) The value of Ca is the capitalisation of the value of C'' at the interest rate of treasury bonds in
force at 31.12.1998 (6,55%), calculated on a daily basis (0,0174%) - Average percentage returns of the
monetary market, Italian Statistical Yearbook, 1998, Istat. Capitalisation period is : (n-1)+ta, equal to 44+65
days.
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Table I.3 – Equivalent allowances granted for the adhesion to temporary 
withdrawal of fishing activity for a sample of Tyrrhenian bottom 






















07CR00080 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
05CR00494 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
06CR00250 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
07SA00750 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
12SA00236 2 3.000.000                         6.579.731                   9.579.731                   
00SA02460 4 11.000.000                       13.647.227                 24.647.227                 
00CV02113 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
00CV01997 3 11.000.000                       10.601.244                 21.601.244                 
00CV02148 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
04GA00955 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
04GA01116 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
04GA01016 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
00GA01238 2 6.000.000                         6.579.731                   12.579.731                 
01GA01325 3 6.000.000                         10.601.244                 16.601.244                 
04GA00562 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
05GE00085 2 6.000.000                         6.579.731                   12.579.731                 
02GE03307 2 6.000.000                         6.579.731                   12.579.731                 
00SP04301 2 6.000.000                         6.579.731                   12.579.731                 
02LI02668 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
02LI02748 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
08LI00074 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
00VG03428 3 6.000.000                         9.625.714                   15.625.714                 
average 3 6.318.182                        9.204.926                  15.523.108                
Notes: (a) amounts disposed by M.D. 09.07.1998 providing for the associated social measures to be addressed to the
units accepting temporary suspension of fishing activity; (b) average shipman's allowance has been obtained by the
use of minimum pay resulting from previdential tables for shipmen.
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Table I.4 - Comparison between opportunity cost and the premium for a 






Ca =  opportunity 





07CR00080 CALABRIA 29,85 31.779.130             15.625.714       16.153.416       YES NO
05CR00494 CALABRIA 14,07 24.524.459             15.625.714       8.898.745         YES NO
06CR00250 CALABRIA 29,51 15.849.647             15.625.714       223.933            YES YES
07SA00750 CAMPANIA 45,12 33.331.419             15.625.714       17.705.705       YES NO
12SA00236 CAMPANIA 9,95 15.351.986             9.579.731         5.772.255         YES NO
00SA02460 CAMPANIA 51,80 30.884.736             24.647.227       6.237.509         YES NO
00CV02113 LAZIO 46,80 23.285.123             15.625.714       7.659.409         YES NO
00CV01997 LAZIO 57,16 9.560.612               21.601.244       12.040.632-       YES YES
00CV02148 LAZIO 39,52 18.517.845             15.625.714       2.892.131         YES NO
04GA00955 LAZIO 42,38 22.088.378             15.625.714       6.462.664         NO NO
04GA01116 LAZIO 46,68 16.855.895             15.625.714       1.230.181         NO NO
04GA01016 LAZIO 44,59 16.366.680             15.625.714       740.966            YES YES
00GA01238 LAZIO 47,03 31.396.860             12.579.731       18.817.129       YES NO
01GA01325 LAZIO 24,60 29.681.274             16.601.244       13.080.030       YES NO
04GA00562 LAZIO 20,45 26.524.493             15.625.714       10.898.779       YES NO
05GE00085 LIGURIA 23,85 32.603.313             12.579.731       20.023.582       YES NO
02GE03307 LIGURIA 17,42 34.504.244             12.579.731       21.924.513       NO NO
00SP04301 LIGURIA 16,34 25.536.282             12.579.731       12.956.551       NO NO
02LI02668 TOSCANA 39,53 17.078.668             15.625.714       1.452.954         NO NO
02LI02748 TOSCANA 27,99 35.368.814             15.625.714       19.743.100       NO NO
08LI00074 TOSCANA 37,37 34.559.155             15.625.714       18.933.441       NO NO
00VG03428 TOSCANA 34,80 28.338.158             15.625.714       12.712.444       NO NO
average VALUES 33,95 25.181.235             15.523.108      9.658.127        
Note: (a) It was assumed that, in case of a premium slightly lower than the income that might be generated by the fishing activity, the
agent decides to withdraw from the activity, thus preferring a certain (although slightly lower) income- rather than an uncertain
income.
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Annex 1B: Questionnaire  
Vessel name: XXXXXX  
Registration number: 0000000 
GRT: 000 
 
Adhesion to temporary withdrawal period: yes/no.  
What are the main reasons of adhesion/not adhesion to the temporary 










self-perception of over/under 
exploitation of resources 
________________________________
________________________________ 








immediate liquidity requirements/not 
immediate liquidity requirements 
________________________________
________________________________ 
delay/not delay to pocket the premium ________________________________
________________________________ 





Chapter 3 References  
 
Clarke F.H. and Munro G.R.(1987) Coastal States, Distant Fishing 
Nations and Extended Jurisdiction: A Principal-Agent Analysis, Natural 
Resource Modelling, 2, pp 81-104 
 
Frost H., Bergholt M.P., Buisman E., Cupo P., Daures F., Davidse W., 
Guyader O., Hatcher A., Hoefnagel E., Jensen F., Kalaydjian R., 
Malvarosa L. and Placenti V. (2001) The significance of economic 
incentives in fisheries management under the CFP, Contract FAIR CT97 
3936, Report no. 127. Copenaghen. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Danish Institute of Agriculture and Fisheries Economics. 
 
HanleyN., Shogren J. F. and White B. (1997) Environmental Economics 
– In Theory and Practice. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Laffont J. J. and Tirole J. (1993) «Introduction» in: A Theory of 
Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, pp. 5-49. London: MIT Press. 
 
Segerson K. (1988) Uncertainty and Incentives for Non-point Pollution 
Control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 15, pp 
87-98.  
 
Varian H. R. (1992) «Information» in: Microeconomic Analysis, pp. 441-
472. London W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
Varian H. R. (1996) Asymmetric Information» in: Intermediate 
Microeconomics – A Modern Approach, pp. 630-650. London W.W. 










The aim of this exercise is to analyse an applied case study within a 
specific economic incentive mechanism related to the reduction or control 
of fishing effort (in terms of capacity).  
 
Under the condition applied to this case-study, the Principal is the subject 
which, in order to achieve its objective, has to induce another subject to 
adopt a given behaviour, while the Agent is the subject which – based 
upon the contract proposed by the principal - will accept to adopt a given 
behaviour.  
 
In this case the effectiveness of a definitive withdrawal or a re-conversion 
of capacity towards other fishing activities and the rationale underlying 
the acceptance of the “contract” by the industry operators will be 
analysed.  
The case study covers the Italian “Driftnet Programme”. It is considered 
as an applied case for definitve fishing effort reduction and, within the P-
A theory , represents a radical condition to test acceptance or not of the 
“contract” offered by the Principal, meant as an economic incentive 
market signal.  
 
4.2. Background and choice of the drifnet case study 
 
 
Driftnets have been accused of not being sufficiently selective and of 
trapping unacceptable numbers of cetaceans, marine mammals, birds and 
reptiles. Driftnets are nets that are held on or just below the surface of the 
water thanks to floats. In the case of large nets, their height is generally 
comprised between 20 to 30 metres. Nets can drift on their own or with 
the vessel to which one end is tied. They are generally set at night, at least 
for large species, and tend to target pelagic species - swimming close to 
the surface of the water - such as tuna, swordfish and salmon.  
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In the early 1990s, responding to public concern, the United Nations 
(UN) passed a resolution asking for a moratorium on the use of large 
driftnets. The EU Council of Ministers decided to impose a maximum 
limit of 2.5km on driftnets used by EU vessels and, from 1994, to ban 
driftnets, but Member States were unable to adopt this proposal. Only on 
June 1998, the Council of Ministers took the decision to ban the use of 
driftnets for the capture of swordfish in the Mediterranean from 1 January 
2002. Since the ban had a negative economic and social impact on the 
communities concerned, the European Union, in co-operation with 
Member States, provided measures to ensure that this impact was kept to 
a minimum.  
 
Italy put in place a programme - the Spadare Programme -, which offered 
financial incentives to vessel owners prepared to abandon driftnets and 
convert to more selective techniques, retrain or leave the fishing sector. 
This programme was  in place until the end of 1999 and EU assistance to 
Italian vessel owners and crews affected by the ban was provided. These 
measures included refurbishing vessels in order to allow for the use of 
safer techniques in targeting the same fisheries, transferring to other 
fisheries, compensation for vessel owners and fishermen ending their 
fishing activities and training for fishermen wishing to turn to alternative 
activities.  
 
The funds for such measures were taken from the financial allocation to 
each of the Member States within the framework of the Structural Funds. 
The Commission also allocated committing some funding to co-financing 
studies and pilot projects seeking to find safer techniques, more 
ecologically friendly and profitable in swordfish fisheries. Thus, until the 
end of 2001, in the thoughts of the EU Commission, driftnets were 
considered to be gradually but rapidly phased out and fishing pressure to 
be reduced as quickly as possible. In the intentions, the 1998 number of 
vessels taking part in swordfish fisheries with driftnets was expected to 
be forty per cent lower than the numbers involved on previous three 
years, while fishing effort had to be gradually reduced over the next 
years.  
 
Italy presented the national programme to the European Commission 
detailing the means and measures to allow for the vessels and crew 
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phasing out by 1st January 2002 driftnets, when they had to be forced out 
from the Italian swordfish fisheries.  
 
The Italian authority was then facing a very difficult situation. In fact the 
Ministry for Agricultural and Forestry Policy, while being aware of the 
crucial socio-economic role of fishing by driftnets in some districts (such 
as Bagnara in the Region of Calabria), had to implement nevertheless a 
set of measures to eliminate this fishing gear.  
 
At national level the plan was approved by the M.D 23.05.97. The plan 
had to be implemented in the period 1997-99. Some additional problems - 
such as the request made by the fishermen associations not to levy any 
duties on the premiums received for participation in the plan - postponed 
the actual implementation of the plan, which was started in 1998. 
Participation in the Plan was also accelerated by the decision made by the 
Community Council in June 1998 to enforce the ban of driftnets as from 
1 January 2002. 
 
 
The “Spadare” Plan in detail 
 
To promote withdrawal of driftnets used for swordfish fishing, the Plan 
provided operators with two options: re-conversion or final withdrawal 
from the activity. Bonus beneficiaries are the shipowner or the 
owner/shipowner and the members of the crew.  
 
Shipowners or owners/shipowners are entitled to receive: 
• retirement allowance, in case of a final withdrawal from any fishing 
activities; 
• re-conversion allowance, if they want to continue their activity by 
using fishing gears other than driftnets.  
 
The allowances included in the “Spadare Plan” and addressed to 
shipowners or owners/shipowners are related to the vessel tonnage (grt) 
and to the year of participation in the plan (the amount of money in 
ECU15, decreases in case of late participation). Of course retirement 
                                                          
15 The “Spadare” Plan was enforced before  the date of enforcement of Euro as 
single currency of the European Union (01.01.1999). 
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allowances are higher than re-conversion ones. Those who decided in 
favour of a final withdrawal and applied for retirement allowance had to 
submit their fishing license along with the nets. Those who accepted the 
re-conversion option had to submit both their nets and their fishing 
license that were replaced with another license.  
 
The members of the crew were able to join the Plan only if the shipowner 
participated as well. In this case each member of the crew decided 
whether to apply for retirement allowance or re-conversion one, 
regardless of the form of participation in the plan decided by the 
shipowner or owner/shipowner.  
The members of the crew of the vessel included in the plan were entitled 
to receive: 
• retirement allowance, if they committed themselves not to carry out 
any economic activities; 
• re-conversion allowance if they shifted to other fishing activities 
carried out by gears other than driftnets or to other economic sectors.  
 
Both the retirement and the capacity adjustment allowance amounted to 
10.000 EURO per year on board (up to a maximum ceiling of 5 years). 
This amount decreased as a function of the years still missing to be 
entitled to the retirement pension. In the time span elapsing, between the 
submission of the application and the reception of the premium, 
participants were given a “waiting” allowance covering the period 
between their withdrawal from the fishing activity and the issue of the 
decree by the Harbour Office by which the retirement or capacity 
adjustment allowance was granted. The “waiting” allowance varied 
according to the length between perpendiculars – higher or lower than 24 
m. – and according to the size of the vessel (gross registered tonnage).  
 
 
4.3. Short  description of the analysis model. 
 
The study of the “spadare” case, chosen for the analysis associated to the 
capacity segment, was conducted by referring to the model firstly 
developed by Ifremer (Kalaydjian, 2000) and  expressed in (1): 
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Equation (1) denotes the acceptance by the agent of a “contract” proposed 
by the principal, where withdrawal or capacity adjustment is required to 
get a premium (allowance). Specifically, the addends of the member on 
the left of the inequality sign of (1) denote the opportunity cost. The 








it period ionactualizat the in flows income of value present net r1Y  
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while the addends on the right denote: 
 
( ) contract the accept  whoagent the to granted premiumagegrtP t =,  
 
contract  theof acceptance sagent'  theofmoment  at the  vessel theof  valuecapital=itPK  
contract the of acceptance sagent' the of moment the at license the of valuePLit =
 
 
Generally, the agent will accept the contract if his opportunity cost will 
be lower or equal to the economic incentive provided by the principal, 
increased by the value of the vessel and of the fishing license. Such an 
acceptance condition is based on the assumption that the agent’s 




4.4. Application and adjustment of the model to the Sicilian “spadare” 
case. 
 
The application of model (1) to the specific drifnet case study requires 
some adjustments. 
 
First, in calculating the agent's opportunity cost the value of the licence is 
not taken into account; in fact, due to the deadline set out for the use of 
drift nets (01.01.2002, as established by the EU Council Decision n. 
1239/98), the calculation of the licence value, which cannot be re-used or 
transferred, is useless.  
 
Secondly, it has to be outlined that the adhesion to the Spadare plan with 
the retirement modality (and clearly with the re-conversion one) does not 
imply necessarily the vessel scrap. The shipowner who asks for the 
retirement bonus oblige himself to not exercise any fishing activity; he 
has only to deliver drift nets and the related fishing license but not the 
vessel16. So he has different options to retain the vessel's property and 
stop fishing, to sell it or to ask for the premium for final withdrawal 
(scrapping) as in the Reg. EC 3699/9317. The first option, in this analysis, 
is not considered as it is not rational from an economic point of view. 
 
Furthermore, including in the calculation of the right member of equality 
(1), the capital value of the vessel at the moment of the agent’s 
acceptance of the contract or the value of the premium for final 
withdrawal, is useful only if the shipowner asks for the retirement bonus. 
Only in this case a definitive stop from every fishing activity takes place 
and the sale of the boat in the second hand market or its demolition can 
be considered as a meaningful consequence. On the contrary, if the 
shipowner asks for the re-conversion bonus, he can use the vessel for 
                                                          
16 This condition is required in re-conversion case too but in this latter case 
fishing license has to be delivered to maritime authorities  and substituted with 
the new one. 
17 EC Reg. of the Council 3699/93, concerning financial instruments for fishery 
(FIFG) and defining the criteria and requirements of the structural community 
actions in fishery, aquacolture, processing and commercialisation of the relevant 
products. 
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other fishing activities; in this case the sale of the boat is no more a 
consequence because it can be re-used.  
 
In order to better explain the real decision process of the agent (in this 
case composed by the shipowner and by the whole equipment18), some 
considerations are rerquired concerning the different form the model will 
assume in relation to the different type of renouncement asked to the 
owner of the boat and to the fishermen by the plan in the two cases 
(retirement and re-conversion). In fact, as previously reported, 
shipowners or owners/shipowners are entitled to receive: 
• retirement allowance, in case of a final withdrawal from any fishing 
activities (that is he is allowed to exercise other economic activities 
other than fishing ones); 
• re-conversion allowance, if they want to continue their activity by 
using fishing gears other than driftnets.  
On the other side, the members of the crew of the vessel included in the 
plan are entitled to receive: 
• retirement allowance, if they commit themselves not to carry out any 
economic activities (that is they have to withdraw definitively by the 
whole economic sector); 
• re-conversion allowance if they shift to other fishing activities carried 
out by gears other than driftnets or to other economic sectors.  
 
Based on these assumptions, in the “spadare” case the model (1) 
becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) (2)                                FP    Nt WgO   Pk OPNT WgFNT WgOPKY rtirtii +++≤+++ ,,,  
 
as for the hypothesis of retirement followed by selling the vessel and 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) (3)                                FP    Nt WgO   PS OPNT WgFNT WgOPKY rtirtii +++≤+++ ,,,  
 
as for the hypothesis of retirement followed by scrapping the vessel. 
                                                          
18 This configuration of the agent depends on the crucial role that the rationales 
of the fishermen have on the owner’s decision process to accept or not the 
contract. 
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On the contrary, as for the hypothesis of re-conversion (1) becomes  
 













it r1YY  
net present value of income flows in the 1997 – 2001 period; this value 
represents the summation of the remuneration both of shipowner and 
crew members labour; 
 
( ) ( )       r1PKPK ii tTi −−+=  
net present value of the 2001 capital value of the vessel (selling of the 
boat); 
 









net present value of the expected stream of a generic wage of the labour 
market by shipowner after the banning year 2001; 
 












net present value of the expected stream of a generic wage of the labour 
market by crew members after the banning year 2001; 
 
( )( ) ( ) [ ]ii tNtNirtrt r1r1OPOP −−− ++= ][  
net present value of the capitalised value of the retirement bonus for the 
shipowner; 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )         r1]r1PkPk ii t-N-t-Ni ++= [  
net present value of the capitalised 1997 value of the vessel; 
 








ir1WgON,t WgO  
net present value of the expected stream of a generic wage of the labour 
market by shipowner after the acceptance of the adhesion to the plan with 
retirement modality; 
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irtrt r1]r1FPFP [  
net present value of the capitalised value of the retirement bonus for crew 
members; 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
  
   r1]r1PSPS ii t-N-t-Ni ++= [  
net present value of the capitalised value of the allowance for final 
withdrawal (scraping of the vessel); 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )ii tNtNircrc r1r1OPOP −−− ++= ][  
 
net present value of the capitalised value of the re-conversion bonus for 
shipowner; 
 











net present value of the expected stream of a wage of the fishery labour 
market by shipowner after the acceptance of the adhesion to the plan with 
re-conversion modality; 
 








ircrc r1]r1FPFP [  
net present value of the capitalised value of the re-conversion bonus for 
crew members; 
 












net present value of the expected stream of a generic wage of the labour 
market by crew members after the acceptance of the adhesion to the plan 
with re-conversion modality; 
 
with: 
i = the generic agent (shipowner + crew members) 
Oi = the generic shipowner 
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Fi = the generic member of the crew 
ni = the number of crew members of the generic vessel. 
t = time 
ti = the beginning time of the considered period (in this case 1997) 
Ti = the ending time of the considered period (in this case 2001) 
N = the ending of the time horizon of the agent 
 
Of course the reference period for the analysis is the period of 
implementation of the “Plan for the Rationalisation and Capacity 
Adjustment of the Spadare”, that is 1997-99.  
In order to give a time horizon to the analysis, it has been decided to 
consider a short term period as the reference for the economic decision 
process of the agent (both shipowner and crew members). For this reason 
N of the formulation has been fixed as the 2001 year. Because of this as: 





The study of the effects resulting from the implementation of an 
allowance-based system is focused on a sample of 8 vessels, belonging to 
three Sicilian administrative districts traditionally devoted to this type of 
fishery, namely vessels belonging to the districts of Mazara del Vallo, 
Palermo e Syracuse (see Annex IB, table I.1). Driftnetters located in the 
above area account for 240 units (35,3% of the national fleet devoted to 
this technique). As to 31.12.99, out of the 240 vessels of these districts, 
63% applied for participating in the plan.  
 
Consequently, the model was applied as follows: 
 
1. calculation of the current value of income flows for the period 1997 – 
2000, with respect to each unit of the sample hereinabove; 
2. calculation of the value of the vessel at the beginning and at the end 
of the period under investigation and of the premium for the scrap of 
the vessel allowed by EC Reg. 3699/93; 
( ) 0N,T WgO i =
( ) .0N,T WgF i =
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3. calculation of the allowance to be granted to the vessels participating 
in the Plan, for both the retirement and re-conversion hypothesis; 
4. calculation of the net present value of generic and fishery wage 
stream expected both by shipowner and fishermen; 
5. comparison between the left and right member of the (1), (2) and (3) 
expressions for each agent. 
 
 
4.5. Analysi framework  
 
1. The current value of income flows is calculated as income deriving, 
to each agent, from driftnets during the period between the beginning 
of the implementation of the 1997 “Spadare” Plan and the 2001 
deadline set out by the community. Income is represented by the 
added value (VA = value of landings – operational costs – fixed 
costs). The nominal income was assumed to be unchanged during the 
period 1997–2001 (see Annex IB, table I.2). Based upon a discount 
rate equal to 6,25% (ordinary portfolio discount at 30.06.1997)19, the 
“net present value” of the income flows is calculated, as reported at 
Annex IB, table I.3. 
 
2. To calculate the 1997 and 2001 vessel values, the estimation based on 
RINA (Italian Register of Vessels) parametershave been used. This 
estimation is based upon the cost of the materials used in the Italian 
shipyards and allowing for the scale economy achieved when tonnage 
increases; in fact the value per unit of gross registered tonnage 
decreases when the vessel size increases. The estimate is time-
discounted allowing for the inflation rate recorded in the period 
1993– 199920 and for the inflation programmed for the period 1999–
200121. To calculate allowance for the scrap of the vessel the 
premium set by EC Reg. 3699/93 for final withdrawal have been 
considered. 1997 vessel value and final withdrawal allowance have 
                                                          
19 Monetary and financial rates, Italian Statistical Yearbook 1998, Istat. 
20 Index number of the consumer prices for households of blue collars and white 
collars,  Italian Statistical Yearbook 1998, Istat. With respect to the value of the 
year 1999 reference was made to the Istat notice, November 1999. 
21 Planned inflation rate as set out in the Economic-Financial Planning Report , 
2000–2003. 
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been first capitalised (to consider the interests they produce in the 
considered period) and than actualised to 1997 (the year of the agent's 
decision). On the contrary, the 2001 vessel value has been actualised 
to 1997 (for the discount rate see point 1). Capitalisation has been 
made considering the interest rate of 6,55% ( return of treasury bonds 
in force at 1997 - Average percentage returns of the monetary market, 
Italian Statistical Yearbook, 1997, Istat). (see Annex IB, table I.4). 
 
3. To calculate the allowances to be granted by the Plan, the average 
composition of the crew has been taken into consideration - as 
recorded by the monitoring carried out through Irepa data collection 
network - along with the amounts set out in the M.D. 23.05.1997 
which ratifies the Plan at national level. Both options were 
considered: retirement and re-conversion. The retirement and re-
conversion allowance is the result of the sum of the bonus granted to 
the owner/shipowner and of the bonuses granted to each member of 
the crew (see Annex IB, table I.5). 
 
4. To calculate the net present value of a generic wage stream expected 
by shipowner (retirement) and fishermen (retirement) the "average 
yearly gross retribution for the non agricultural private sector, year 
1994” has been taken into account; an actualisation, based on the 
average yearly index number for labour retributions (1994 –1997), 
has been made.22 To calculate the net present value of the fishery 
wage stream expected by shipowner (re-conversion) the average 
labour cost for purse seine and small scale fishery has been 
considered, for they are the only fishing gears to which a shipowner 
is allowed to re-convert.23 The actualisation has been made on a 
discount rate equal to 6,25% (see point 1) – Annex IB, table I.6. 
 
5. The double option given to each agent enabled us to make three 
different comparisons among: 
 
• C e P1 
• C2 e P2 
• C2 e P3 
                                                          
22 Italian Statistical Yearbook 1997, Istat. 
23 Economic Observatory of Italian Fisheries, Irepa, Italy 1997. 
 41
where: 
C: the left member of the expression (2), (3) e (4); 
P1: the right member of expression (2); 
P2: the right member of expression (3); 
P3: the right member of expression (4). 
 




4.6. Model results 
 
The comparison mentioned in point 4 above leads to the following 
conclusions : 
 
1. The difference between C and P is positive in 38% of the cases; for 
these cases (C – P > 0 or C > P) swordfish represents most of the 
catches; 
2. In the remainder 62% it results that C – P < 0 or C < P; in particular, 
the value of P1 (retirement followed by the sell of the boat) is the 
highest value among C, P1, P2 (retirement followed by the scrap of 
the boat) and P3 (re-conversion). In these latter cases catches are 
composed partly (3.4% to 28.4%) by small pelagic species, like 
anchovies and sardines. The average price of these species, generally 
lower compared to that of swordfish, influences the average price of 
the productive mix and, as a consequence, of total revenues (the base 
for the calculation of C). 
 
 
At a first sight these results suggest that the market signal send by the 
Principal – the premium – is, somehow, lower than that the Agent 
opportunity cost’s. Only for boats with lesser swordfish target 
specification the Principal-premium is higher than the Agent-opportunity 
cost’s. In other words, the principal settled the premium according to 





4.7. Improving results and conclusions: complementary desk-case study 
and questionnaires 
 
Model results exposed in paragraph 4.6 have successfully been completed 
with a complementary desk-case study. In order to have a more detailed 
view of the real effectiveness of national policy measures concerning 
adjustment capacity, specifically measures provided for in the Italian 
“Spadare” Plan, a questionnaire has been given to the units under 
analysis. The aim of the questionnaire (Annex IC) is to investigate about 
the adhesion or not to the “contract” offered by the principal and also to 
investigate the rationale, either economic or not, that influenced each 
agent to accept or not the “contract”.  
 
The answers to the questionnaires allow the following information: 
a) modality of adhesion to the “Spadare” Plan both of shipowner and of 
each member of the crew24; 
b) year of adhesion; 
c) for each fisherman, years on board and number of years until 
retirement pension in order to calculate bonus granted by fishery 
authority; 
d) rationale, either economic or not, influencing each agent to accept or 
not the “contract”. 
 
Questionnaires results are hereinafter reported:  
 
• 87,5% of the vessels belonging to the sample adhered to the Plan, i.e 
accepted the “contract”, from its outset in 1997; only one unit 
adhered in 1998. 
 
• 50% of shipowners asked retirement bonus, while the other 50% 
asked the re-conversion one. 
 
• Only 15% of the crewmembers asked for retirement bonus, i.e. 3 
units out of 20; on the contrary, 14 crewmebers (70% on the total) 
                                                          
24 In fact in the first phase of the analysis (see paragraph 5, point 3) the 
calculation of both retirement and re-conversion bonuses have been calculated. 
Both of them have been successfully compared to the value of the opportunity 
cost (see paragraph 5, point 4). 
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asked for re-conversion to other fishing activities; finally 3 
crewmembers did not asked for bonus at all  (see Annex IB table 
I.8)25. 
 
• The agents’ decision to accept the “contract” was influenced mainly 
by the following reasons: a) fishing by the use of drift nets of a 
maximum allowed length of 2,5 kilometres is considered to be 
economically no profitable by fishing operators;  
b) controls on driftnets fishery were considered as making fishing 
activity difficult to carry on; in other words, situation of moral hazard 
is to be consider impracticable – now and mostly in the future.  
 
• In 50% of the cases, even if agents accepted the “contract”, the 
premium P is lower than the opportunity cost of each agent. In 
particular it results that in half of these latter cases C1 > P1 > P2 and 
in the other half that C1 > P3 (see Annex IB, table I.9). 
 
• In the remainder 50% of the cases it can be seen that P > C. In 
particular it results that in half of these latter cases P1 > C > P3 and in 
the other half that  P3 > C. (see Annex IB, table I.9). 
 
• The correspondence between real and rational answer to the contract 
is verified in 50% of the cases. This means that the model of analysis 
can explain half of the cases. 
 
 
If the aim of the “Spadare” Plan was to induce operators (agents) using 
driftnets to a general adhesion or to a general acceptance of the 
“contract”, it can be concluded that the target has been reached. 
Nevertheless, the main reason should not be conduced to “economic 
rationality” or, in the case, to the premium offered by the Principal. The 
                                                          
25 The latter situation is probably an exceptional case. Three among four 
members belonging to a vessel’s crew asked for no one bonus. This is a very 
strange situation: a father and his two sons lost about 300 millions ITL hoping to 
continue fishing with drift nets if they not adhere personally to the Plan. In this 
case, monetary concerns had not applied to agents’ decision and non monetary 
economic incentives should be taken into consideration.  
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premium was not perceived as equivalent to an  “economic incentives” in 
any case.  
 
The Sicilian case study of the “spadare”26 demonstrates that the 
underlying agents’ decision process cannot be justified in the framework 
of the microeconomic model of the Principal and Agent. The agents’ 
decision process was not influenced only by a mere economic logic. In 
fact, in many cases, fishing by the use of driftnets allows to obtain an 
income much higher than the bonuses granted by Ministry for Agriculture 
and Forestry Policy for the adhesion to the “Spadare” Plan.27 As such, 
from a theoretical point of view, the Agents should have refused the 
“contract” offered by the Principal instead of accepting.  
 
Command and control policy seems to be the general framework 
environment underlining agent’s decision. Precisely, the premium as a 
proxy of an economic incentive inducing operators to stop driftnets 
fishing before the 1st January 2002 deadlines, was not the main cause for 
acceptance.  
 
In the applied case, the market signals do not give everywhere a 
quantitative measure of the influence on the agents’ behaviour and on 
their decision to accept the “contract”; therefore, the minimum allowance 
premium does not perform as an economic incentive. Premium was 
accepted only to partially compensate losses.  
 
The main reason for a general adhesion or for a general acceptance of the 
“contract”, was the impossibility to follow a moral hazard approach 
thanks to a command and control scheme. So far, economic incentives 
were not a substitute of rules set upon a command and control scheme for 
capacity reduction.  
 
It is not by chance that premium allowance were undertaken only and 
exclusively because of the crucial socio-economic implications of the 
ban. The allowed provisions compensate only partially the negative 
economic and social impact on the communities concerned. In this 
                                                          
26 This conclusion is probably valid also for the others Italian geographical areas 
devoted to this type of fishery. 
27 For a quantitative description of data analysis see Annex  IA  
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respect, economic incentives, meant as free signal market for underlying 
agents’ decision process, should not be confused with minimum 
allowances and vice-versa.  
 
The previous results demonstrates that in the case of hidden information 
or adverse selection the Principal is not able to set economic incentives 
meant as correct free market signals and the Agents’ decisions process is 
not exclusively influenced by a mere economic logic.  
 
 46
 Annex IB: Sampling and data analysis 
 
Table I.1 – Sample of vessels under analysis – Sicilian “spadare”, 1997. 
Table I.2 – Harvests, earnings and average price of sample’s units, 1997 
Table I.3 – Earnings, operative costs, added value and “net present value” 
of sample’s units, 1997 (ITL ‘000). 
Table I.4 – Vessel value at the coming in force of “Spadare plan” (1997) 
and of the definitive banning of driftnets (2001) and final withdrawal 
allowance (ITL ‘000). 
Table I.5 – Retirement and re-conversion bonuses in the hypothesis of 
adhesion to the "Spadare plan" (ITL '000). 
Table I.6 - Generic and fishery wage stream expected both by shipowner 
and crew members after the adhesion to the driftnets plan (ITL '000). 
Table I.7 – Opportunity cost and premium for hypothesis of retirement 
and re-conversion (ITL ‘000). 
Table I.8 – Adhesion form to the “Spadare plan” resulting from 
questionnaires and calculation of total bonus for each sample unit. 
Table I.9 – Calculation of opportunity cost of the premium on the basis of 
questionnaires’ answers (ITL ‘000) and comparison between rational and 
real answer to the contract. 
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Table I.2 – Harvests, earnings and average price of sample’s units, 1997 
 
 












01MZ00846 Mazara del Vallo 5,4 10,3 46 2 170
01MZ00937 Mazara del Vallo 7,9 10,0 40 2 158
01MZ00988 Mazara del Vallo 7,4 12,3 198 3 176
06MZ00397 Mazara del Vallo 15,9 15,9 109 3 107
04PA00919 Palermo 5,8 9,9 80 2 186
04PA00959 Palermo 10,0 10,3 95 2 166
04PA01040 Palermo 16,2 14,9 105 5 184
03SR00936 Siracusa 21,9 15,4 161 3 128
average values 11,3 12,4 104 3 159
Source:  Irepa, Economic Observatory of Fisheries, Italy 1997
Note: the name of the vessels is omitted because of privacy rules.
registration number  harvests (tons) 
 earnings (ITL 
'000) 
 average weighted 
price (ITL/kG) 
01MZ00846 52.814                        289.333                   5.478                       
01MZ00937 42.780                        360.084                   8.417                       
01MZ00988 65.890                        358.073                   5.434                       
06MZ00397 15.093                        174.231                   11.544                     
04PA00919 6.812                          90.043                     13.218                     
04PA00959 6.435                          83.563                     12.986                     
04PA01040 10.978                        162.539                   14.806                     
03SR00936 15.176                        143.870                   9.480                       
average values 26.997                        207.717                  10.170                    
Source:  Irepa, Economic Observatory of Fisheries, Italy 1997
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Table I.3 – Earnings, operative costs, added value and “net present 
value” of sample’s units,  




 net present value of 
income flows (1) 
 A 
01MZ00846 289.333 80.366 208.967 874.291                     
01MZ00937 360.084 124.972 235.112 983.678                     
01MZ00988 358.073 145.442 212.631 889.620                     
06MZ00397 174.231 27.510 146.721 613.861                     
04PA00919 90.043 30.460 59.583 249.287                     
04PA00959 83.563 27.878 55.685 232.979                     
04PA01040 162.539 60.843 101.696 425.483                     
03SR00936 143.870 66.224 77.646 324.861                     
average values 207.717 70.462 137.255 574.257
Source: Irepa, Economic Observatory of Fisheries, Italy 1997
Note : (1) net present value calculated for the period 1997-2001 on the actualization rate of 6,25% (ordinary portfolio 
discount at 30.06.1997 - Monetary and financial rates, Italian Statistical Yearbook 1998, Istat).
registration number earnings operative costs added value
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Table I.4 – Vessel value at the coming in force of “Spadare plan” (1997) 
and of the definitive 





  vessel value 2001 (a)  vessel value 1997 (a)  
 allowance for final 
withdrawal (b) 
 B  C  D 
01MZ00846 169.242                                    158.070                                  46.987                                 
01MZ00937 246.342                                    230.080                                  76.825                                 
01MZ00988 232.865                                    217.493                                  87.235                                 
06MZ00397 437.131                                    408.275                                  178.600                               
04PA00919 182.092                                    170.072                                  60.943                                 
04PA00959 312.785                                    292.137                                  93.977                                 
04PA01040 444.262                                    414.935                                  195.995                               
03SR00936 457.582                                    427.375                                  276.703                               
average values 310.288                                    289.805                                 127.158                              
Source: (a) Irepa elaboration on RINA data, Italian Register of Vessels. Estimation of RINA of a single grt unit refers
to 1992. Actualization has been made using inflation rate for the period 1993 - 1999 ( Index number of the consumer
prices for households of blue collars and white collars, Italian Statistical Yearbook 1998, Istat. With respect to the
value of the year 1999 reference was made to the Istat notice, November 1999) and planned inflation rate for the
period 2000 - 2001. (b) Irepa elaboration on amounts disposed by EC Reg. 3699/93 for final withdrawal.
Note: 1997 vessel value and final withdrawal allowance have been first capitalised (to consider the interests amount
they produce in the considered period) and than actualized to 1997 (the year of the agent's decision). On the contrary,
the 2001 vessel value has been actualised to 1997. For discount rate: see table 3. Capitalization has been made on the
interest rate of 6,55% ( return of treasury bonds in force at 1997 - Average percentage returns of the monetary market,
Italian Statistical Yearbook, 1997, Istat).
registration number
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Table I.5 – Retirement and re-conversion bonuses in the hypothesis of 
adhesion to the  
"Spadare plan" (ITL '000). 
 
 
 E  F 
01MZ00846 391.249                            256.997                               
01MZ00937 391.249                            256.997                               
01MZ00988 487.144                            295.355                               
06MZ00397 583.038                            333.713                               
04PA00919 391.249                            256.997                               
04PA00959 391.249                            256.997                               
04PA01040 678.933                            372.070                               
03SR00936 421.936                            287.683                               
average values 467.006                           289.601                              
Source:  Irepa, Economic Observatory of Fisheries, Italy 1997
Note: for calculation of retirement and re-conversion allowances we refer to decree of
implementation of "Spadare plan" (M.D. 23.05.1997). The hypothesis consider: a)
adhesion to the plan, for all units, in 1997; b) for shipmen, average years on board equal
or major than 5 years and average years until retirement equal or major than 5.
Retirement and re-conversion bonuses have been first capitalised (to consider the interest
they produce in the considered period) and than actualised to 1997 (the year of the




Table I.6 - Generic and fishery wage stream expected both by shipowner 




Table I.7 – Opportunity cost and premium for hypothesis of retirement 
and re-conversion (ITL ‘000). 
 
 
average values 130.437                          358.701                   78.453                           
Note: (a) an actualisation, based on the average yearly index number for labour remunerations, have been
made.(b) average labour cost for purse seine and small scale fishery has been considered, for they are the
only fishing gears to which a vessel's owner can re-convert
Source: (a) Irepa elaboration on "average yearly gross retribution for the non agricultural private sector, year




01MZ00846 1.043.533            679.757                  568.674               596.324                  no
01MZ00937 1.230.020            751.766                  598.511               596.324                  no
01MZ00988 1.122.485            835.074                  704.815               765.118                  no
06MZ00397 1.050.993            1.121.750               892.075               933.913                  yes (P1)
04PA00919 431.380               691.758                  582.629               596.324                  yes (P1)
04PA00959 545.764               813.824                  615.663               596.324                  yes (P1)
04PA01040 869.744               1.224.304               1.005.365            1.102.708               yes (P1)
03SR00936 782.442               979.748                  829.076               627.010                  yes (P1)
average values 884.545              887.248                 724.601              726.755                  
Source:  Irepa elaboration, 2000 
Note : C = A + B; P1 = C + E + G ; P2 = D + E + G; P3 = F + H + I ( see tables I.3, I.4; I.5, I.6). P1 represents retirement followed by
the sell of the vessel; P2 represents retirement followed by scrap of the vessel (see paragraph 4 of the paper ). In fact, because the
information related to the vessel's destiny after the adhesion to the driftnets plan, is not known, we have considered both the options.
registration number
 retirement 
C rational answer to the contract 
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Table I.8 – Adhesion form to the “Spadare plan” resulting from 

















  shipowner 
(b) 
  retirement 





members   ( 
c) 
total
L M N O
01MZ00846 5,4 2 1997 RT 1 1 189.871          95.894             38.358         324.123      
01MZ00937 7,86 2 1997 RC -         2 180.282          -                       76.716         256.997      
01MZ00988 7,43 3 1997 RC -         3 195.625          -                       115.073       310.698      
06MZ00397 15,9 4 1997 RT -         1 199.460          -                       38.358         237.818      
04PA00919 5,81 2 1997 RC -         2 105.484          -                       76.716         182.199      
04PA00959 9,98 2 1998 RC -         2 157.267          -                       76.716         233.982      
04PA01040 16,2 3 1997 RT 1 2 199.460          95.894             76.716         372.070      
03SR00936 21,9 2 1997 RT 1 1 230.147          95.894             38.358         364.399      
average values 11,3 182.199         35.960             67.126         285.286     
total 20             3       14    
Source: Irepa elaborations, 2000 
(a) responses surveyed by questionnaires
(c )  calculation based on questionnaires' answers and on M.D. 27.05.1997 ("Spadare plan")
(d) retirement and re-conversion bonuses have been first capitalised (to consider the interests amount they produce in the considered



















bonus (ITL '000) (d)
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Table I.9 – Calculation of opportunity cost of the premium on the basis of 
questionnaires’ answers (ITL ‘000) and comparison between rational 
















01MZ00846 B 1.043.533             612.630     501.547     -                 no yes
01MZ00937 R 1.230.020             -                 -                 596.324     no yes
01MZ00988 R 1.122.485             -                 -                 650.025     no yes
06MZ00397 B 1.050.993             776.530     546.855     -                 no yes
04PA00919 R 431.380                -                 -                 782.400     yes (p3) yes
04PA00959 R 545.764                -                 -                 573.309     yes (p3) yes
04PA01040 B 869.744                917.442     698.503     -                 yes (p1) yes
03SR00936 B 782.442                922.211     771.539     -                 yes (p1) yes
average values 574.257                282.087    290.584    672.433    
Source:  Irepa 2000
(a) see table I.7
real answer
(b) p1 = C + O + G ; p2 = D + O + G; p3 = O + H + I ( see tables I.4; I.5, I.6, I.7 and I.8). p1 represents retirement (for the
shipowner) followed by the sell of the vessel; p2 represents retirement (for the shipowner) followed by scrap of the vessel (see
paragraph 4 of the paper ). In fact, because the information related to the vessel's destiny after the adhesion to the driftnets
plan, is not known, we have considered both the options.
rational 











Annex IC: Questionnaire 
 
Vessel name: XXXXXX  
Registration number: 0000000 
GRT: 000 
 
Years on board of  fishermen (reference year: 1997): 
 
Fishermen Numbers of years on board 
1°   
2°   
3°   
4°   
5°   
 
Number of years until retirement pension (reference year: 1997): 
 
Fishermen Number of years until 
retirement 
1° o  
2°   
3°   
4°   
5°   
 
Adhesion to “spadare” plan: yes/no 
Year of adhesion: 1997, 1998 or 1999? 
Adhesion form: definitive withdrawal (or retirement)/ re-conversion  
What are the main reasons of adhesion/not adhesion to the “spadare” plan 




premium higher/lower to potential income _____________________________
_____________________________ 












immediate liquidity requirements/not 
immediate liquidity requirements 
_____________________________
_____________________________ 
delay/not delay to pocket the premium _____________________________
_____________________________ 
possibility/refuse to have a stop from job _____________________________
_____________________________ 
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